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ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics
#659

February 2018

JEL: D21, L15, L82

ISBN: 0 86831 659 8
Media, fake news, and debunking$^1$

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Version of February 16, 2018

$^1$This paper was commenced while Long was a Fred Gruen visiting professor at the Australian National University. We are grateful to Theory Seminar participants at the ANU for useful comments and suggestions.

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Abstract

We construct a Hotelling-type model of two media providers, each of whom can issue fake and/or real news and each of whom can invest in the debunking of their rival’s fake news. The model assumes that consumers have an innate preference for one provider or the other and value real news. However, that valuation varies according to their bias favoring one provider or the other. We demonstrate a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which only one firm issues fake news and we show, in this setting, that increased polarization of consumers – represented by a wider distribution – increases the prevalence of both fake news and debunking expenditures and is welfare reducing. We also show, inter alia, that a stronger preference by consumers for their preferred provider lowers both fake news and debunking. Finally, we compare monopoly and duopoly market structures in terms of “fake news” provision and show that a public news provider can be welfare improving.

JEL Classification: D21, L15, L82

Keywords: fake news, media, debunking
1 Introduction

*The Economist* (Standage, 2017) reports that readers of the New York newspaper *The Sun* in 1835 were astonished to learn that the moon hosted “goat-like creatures with blue skin” and “giant man-bats . . . collecting fruit and holding animated conversations”, facts allegedly revealed by an ongoing British astronomical observation expedition in South Africa. *The Sun*’s circulation more than doubled following this sensation, “[b]ut it was soon exposed by rival papers.” It is thought that the hoax was deliberately perpetrated by the newspaper’s editor taking advantage of the fact that, while there was indeed just such an expedition under way, communication with it was hugely delayed as it could only be by letter.

“Fake news” is not a new phenomenon, clearly. Nevertheless, it seems to have resurfaced with a vengeance in recent years. Figure 1 shows data for the five years to March 2017 for Google searches for the term “fake news” and its explosion in late 2016 is striking.

![Interest over time](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=today%205-y&q=fake%20news)

**Figure 1: Google Trends data**

The prevalence of fake news is a matter for some public policy concern. One might think that it simply caters to a taste and is no less innocuous than the rise of hula hoops or fidget spinners, but there is compelling theory and evidence that media power is significant in determining, *inter alia*, voting participation itself and decision-making in

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1 These data are generated by Google Trends [https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=today%205-y&q=fake%20news](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=today%205-y&q=fake%20news) where the “interest over time” numbers measure searches in the relevant time period relative to their peak in that period – early March 2017.
the polling booth (see Prat (2016), Allcott & Gentzkow (2017), Chan and Suen (2008) and Enikolopov et al (2011).)

“Fake news” is not a phenomenon that has escaped the attention of economists – indeed, the study of media economics is a long-standing one that has in many ways foreseen the state of affairs that now prevails – but most modelling relating to so-called fake news has overlooked the incentives of media providers to expose their rivals, exactly as happened in the “Great Moon Hoax” perpetrated by The Sun in 1835. In this paper we develop a model in which the debunking activities of rivals are key.

Many commentators have expressed concern in recent years at the increased ease with which voters can confine their news consumption to material that confirms their own pre-existing views\(^2\) – so-called filter bubbles, echo chambers or, from the supply side, narrow-casting – and there is substantial evidence (see Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) and the references therein) that news consumers do not simply seek the truth alone but, rather, have preferences for information that conforms to their own beliefs. Furthermore, there is a very widespread perception that political views, particularly in the US, have become increasingly polarized over time. Lelkes (2016) suggests that this perception is misleading in the aggregate but not at the extremes: he provides some evidence that polarization, as manifested in public opinion, is, “driven by partisans, who increasingly dislike one another.” A model of news demand and supply should account for these features but it should also take into account the possibility of fact-checking and debunking – the exposure of rivals’ fake news. Fact-checking as an explicit activity is something that has grown significantly in the past decade – Spivak (2011) refers to the fact-checking “explosion” – and, while there are standalone fact-checkers (such as Snopes.com and FactCheck.org) most are affiliated with news organizations (Graves et al, 2015.)

In this paper, we develop a Hotelling-style model of news media in which consumers have a preference for one news source or the other, *ceteris paribus*. However, we allow that these media can choose to generate and distribute either or both fake and real news and also that they can choose to engage in the costly debunking of their rival’s

\(^2\)This suggests a deliberate implementation of Santayana’s 1905 dictum that, “most men’s conscience, habits, and opinions are borrowed from convention and gather continually comforting assurances from the same social consensus that originally suggested them.”
fake news. Absent the debunking, consumers cannot distinguish fake from real news\textsuperscript{3} but debunking efforts do contribute to the exposure of fake news. When consumers realize that some proportion of what they are being sold is fabricated, their willingness to pay for the news is reduced. However, the effectiveness of debunking varies across consumers according to their partisanship; indeed, some consumers are not at all swayed by any exposure of their preferred media outlet.\textsuperscript{4} In this model we first demonstrate that any Nash equilibrium to the two-stage choice of news and debunking followed by price-setting must involve one and only one of the media outlets issuing any fake news and the other outlet actively undertaking debunking activity. We characterize just such an equilibrium and then conduct a number of comparative statics exercises to see the impact on the media firms’ choices and on some measure of social welfare of changes in underlying parameters.

Amongst other things, we show that increased polarization of consumers, in a sense made clear in the paper, will increase both the amount of fake news and the extent of debunking and is welfare-reducing. Perhaps surprisingly, decreased sensitivity of consumers to debunked fake news has the opposite qualitative effects: a welfare-increasing fall in both fake news and its debunking. We also address the question raised by Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) of whether competition between media outlets reduces media bias and show that it does in one sense – some consumers will get unbiased news in competition, whereas under monopoly they would not – but not in another, as some consumers get more biased news than they would otherwise. Regardless, the duopoly solution is welfare-reducing compared to a monopoly, when the market is covered. Finally, we consider the effects of introducing a public news provider into this setting and demonstrate that, while it reduces commercial debunking activity, it does reduce aggregate fake news and may be welfare improving, depending on costs.

There is a significant literature, both within economics and in other disciplines, that

\textsuperscript{3}The late journalist John Diamond wrote in 1995, perhaps in light of Steiner’s famous 1993 “On the internet nobody knows you’re a dog” New Yorker cartoon, “...the real problem with the Internet is that everything written on it is true. Or, rather, there is no real way of discerning truth from lies” but it is not at all clear that that is a problem restricted to the internet. (Cited in Ball, 2017.)

\textsuperscript{4}Barrera Rodriguez et al (2017) conducted a randomized online experiment with potential French voters during the 2017 presidential election campaign, exposing subjects to quotes from Marie Le Pen, a right-wing candidate, and/or real facts and found that those intending to vote for her were unswayed by correct information. While fact-checking and exposure to correct information did seem to move agents’ beliefs to better align with actual facts, this, “success in correcting factual knowledge does not translate into an impact on voting intentions” (p.32.)
considers the news media and, in recent years, more focus has come to bear on the incentives such media might have to mislead. In work related to ours, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) consider a Hotelling-type model of two newspapers serving consumers who hold biased beliefs and who prefer to hear news slanted towards those beliefs. The newspapers can choose the degree to which they “slant” their stories towards particular beliefs. The authors consider whether competition – comparing the outcome with a single provider to that of a duopoly, each choosing its slant – reduces the slanting of news and find it does not, in the presence of biased consumers. The authors also study the impact of consumer heterogeneity on the accuracy of news provision, in a sense made clear in the paper, and find that the slanting of news by competing outlets can “offset” each other so that, while an ordinary consumer reading only one source might be quite misinformed, the beliefs of, “a hypothetical conscientious reader, who reads multiple sources... become more accurate than they are with homogeneous consumers” (p.1033.) Their paper, however, does not consider pure “fake news” – instead, the media receive an unbiased but noisy signal of some true state (about which the consumers care to learn) and issue news equal to the signal plus some slant – and nor does it allow for debunking efforts by rival firms.

Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) is a recent overview of much of the directly related literature. It considers the economics of fake news very directly and summarizes a model of Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Stone (2016) in which, in contrast to Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), fake news can be characterized as being uncorrelated with the truth. “Fake news arises in equilibrium because it is cheaper to provide than precise signals, because consumers cannot costlessly infer accuracy, and because consumers may enjoy partisan news” (p.212.) Again, these models do not consider the possibility of rivalrous debunking.

A recent paper by Cagé (2017) considers a model of newspapers with quality-dependent fixed costs and considers entry in a Hotelling model in which the market may not initially be covered, due to the existence of heterogeneous tastes across consumers. Media entry then expands the market and increases differentiation (to lessen subsequent price competition) in that setting. She then introduces another dimension of heterogeneity in preferences between “hard” news, which relates to material that is informative in the political process, and “soft” news which is more entertainment related. If the willingness to pay for these types differs in terms of their heterogeneity across consumers then competing providers will reduce the quality of the less heterogeneously distributed attribute. If that attribute is hard news, Cagé argues that this increased media competition, by
reducing the quality of such news, might reduce the likelihood of people participating in the political process. She takes this to a dataset of French newspapers and finds that media entry does reduce the quantity of hard news provision, more so in areas of more homogeneous populations, and that this is associated with a decrease in turnout at local elections. While this is not strictly a model of fake news or debunking, it does tie together quite nicely some of the issues associated with, and concerns generated by, the rise of fake news, concerns that underpin some of our welfare analysis.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe, lay out and solve the model we use. In Section 3, we consider a number of comparative statics, including welfare effects. Section 4 extends the model and discusses the welfare implications of a monopoly and of a public broadcaster. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.

2 The model

We suppose a unit mass of consumers is uniformly distributed on an interval \([0, \Delta]\). This represents a spectrum of tastes for a particular media viewpoint and we suppose that there are two media providers – referred to hereafter as newspapers, but they could be online providers of news content too – one located at each end of this spectrum. That is, firm \(i = 1\) is located at 0 and firm \(i = 2\) at \(\Delta\). Each produces a quantum of ‘news’, normalized to unity, to be sold to each consumer and each firm can choose what proportion of that quantum is fake news \((F_i)\) and what is real \((N_i)\). So \(N_i = 1 - F_i\). Each firm can also choose to expend resources on debunking its rival’s fake news and such efforts are denoted \(x_i\). Dropping firm subscripts henceforth where there is no confusion in so doing, we assume that all of these activities have increasing, quadratic cost functions:

\[
C_F(F) = \frac{1}{2}cF^2, \quad C_N(N) = \frac{1}{2}\gamma N^2, \quad C_X(X) = \frac{1}{2}\delta X^2, \quad \text{for positive constants } c, \gamma, \delta.
\]

It is noteworthy that the initial marginal cost of each activity is zero. We assume that fake news and debunking activity interact to generate a level of distrust, denoted \(y_i = G(F_i, D_j) \in [0, 1]\) in a firm’s content where \(D_j = \omega(F_j,X_j)X_j+X\). Here \(D_j\) denotes the debunking of \(F_i\) and it consists of the debunking efforts of rival firm \(X_j\) as well as a background constant level of debunking, \(X\), discussed further below. We make the
following assumptions on this function:

\[ G(0, D) = G(F, 0) = 0. \]

For \( (F, D) \neq (0, 0), G(\cdot) \) is increasing in \( F \) and \( D \) and \( \frac{\partial^2 G}{\partial F \partial D} > 0. \)

Credibility

\[ \omega(F_j X_j) = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if } F_j X_j > 0, \\ 1 \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases} \]

The first of these states that if a firm issues no fake news then there is no distrust of it or, if it issues fake news but there is no debunking, it is still fully trusted. This encapsulates the assumption that consumers cannot distinguish between real and fake news absent debunking. The assumptions on the partial derivatives state that the distrust in a firm that issues fake news and is at least partially exposed is greater, \textit{ceteris paribus}, the more fake news it puts out and the higher are the debunking efforts of its rival, and that the marginal impact of more fake news on distrust is higher the higher is the debunking activity of the rival. The third assumption states that a firm that itself is exposed as issuing fake news has no credibility in any efforts it makes to debunk its rival. So if \( F_1 > 0 \), for example, and so is \( X_1 \), this means that firm 1 is issuing fake news and is also attempting to debunk firm 2. The assumption then states that firm 1’s debunking has no effect – trust in firm 2 is affected only by the constant background debunking \( X \). Finally, the term \( X \) is designed to capture a background level of general skepticism and implies that fake news will always be at least partially exposed, regardless of the debunking efforts of rival firms. To some extent this captures the reality of debunking that is not mediated through rivals (such as \texttt{snopes.com} or \texttt{FactCheck.org}) but it also contributes to the specification of credibility here. Even if a rival does no debunking, in our model a fake news issuer is still non-credible as a debunker of others, because they will be at least partially exposed through this background skepticism.

Now consider a consumer indexed by the location \( \theta \in [0, \Delta] \). If they purchase the newspaper from firm \( i = 1, 2 \) (where 1 is at point 0 on the ideological spectrum and 2 at point \( \Delta \)) for price \( p_1 \) or \( p_2 \) then they derive utility of

\[ U_{\theta_1} = (1 - \theta k y_1(F_1, D_2)) v - t \theta - p_1 \]
\[ U_{\theta_2} = (1 - (\Delta - \theta) k y_2(F_2, D_1)) v - t (\Delta - \theta) - p_2 \]

\[ ^5 \text{As usual in the application of the Hotelling framework to media markets, we can think of prices literally as the dollar price paid for a media/newspaper subscription, or as a proxy for the disutility of exposure to advertising (see Richardson, 2006, for an explicit model of the latter).} \]
Here $v$ represents the willingness to pay for a fully trusted, ideal newspaper and $t$ is
the linear disutility associated with a less-than-ideal newspaper (in terms of its position
on this ideological spectrum *vis-à-vis* the consumer). The consumer’s location $\theta$ plays two
roles here. First, as in the standard Hotelling model, it determines the ideological stance
a consumer would desire of its ideal newspaper and so affects the losses a consumer
incurs if such an ideal is not available. Second, however, we assume that a consumer’s
susceptibility to debunking of its preferred newspaper’s fake news is greater the weaker
is the consumer’s preference for that newspaper. As noted above, a consumer’s distrust
of an exposed fake news issuer, $y$, depends on the level of fake news and the extent of
debunking and we assume it reduces the consumer’s willingness to pay for their preferred
newspaper. However, a given level of distrust is assumed to reduce that willingness to
pay by more for the less committed consumer – that is, that discount is increasing in
the ‘distance’ of the consumer from their chosen provider. Finally, $k$ is a parameter that
measures the sensitivity of consumers to the distrust function $y$ and on which we can
undertake comparative static exercises. Note that if $k = 0$ then this model collapses
perfectly to a standard, textbook Hotelling model. As in Allcott and Gentzkow (2017),
consumers here cannot, by themselves, distinguish fake from real news and they also enjoy
partisan news.

Each consumer chooses the provider that maximizes their welfare; consequently there
is a marginal or pivotal consumer, $\tilde{\theta}$, such that all consumers to the ‘right’ (*i.e.* with
$\theta > \tilde{\theta}$) will purchase from firm 2 and all to the left ($\theta < \tilde{\theta}$) will buy from firm 1 where
dropping function arguments for notational clarity, the marginal consumer is defined by
indifference:

$$
(1 - \tilde{\theta}ky_1)v - t\tilde{\theta} - p_1 = (1 - \left(\Delta - \tilde{\theta}\right)ky_2)v - t\left(\Delta - \tilde{\theta}\right) - p_2.
$$

This solves for the marginal consumer explicitly:

$$
\tilde{\theta} = \frac{t\Delta + (p_2 - p_1) + \Delta kvy_2}{2t + vk(y_1 + y_2)}.
$$

---

6 In the context of media markets, as noted in Richardson (2006) and elsewhere, the possibility arises
that a consumer can “roll their own” ideal variety by simply combining the two extremes in their preferred ratio
– sometimes referred to as “multi-homing” in this literature. This means that all “transport costs” are
avoided but, of course, the consumer incurs two purchase prices. In our setting, however, it turns out that
this is never an attractive option: the consumer with the lowest surplus here is the marginal consumer
at $\tilde{\theta}$ and it can be shown that $v - p_1 - p_2$ is lower (at equilibrium prices) than $(1 - \tilde{\theta}ky_1)v - t\tilde{\theta} - p_1 =
(1 - (\Delta - \tilde{\theta})ky_2)v - t(\Delta - \tilde{\theta}) - p_2$. 

---

7
Note, for later reference, that:

\[ \tilde{\theta}_{|y_2=0} = \frac{t\Delta + (p_2 - p_1)}{2t + vky_1}. \]

As one would expect, if the level of distrust were the same for both firms \((y_1 = y_2 = y)\) and prices were equal \((p_1 = p_2)\) then \(\tilde{\theta} = \Delta/2\). Thus demands facing firm 1 and firm 2 are \(D_1 = \tilde{\theta}/\Delta\) and \(D_2 = (\Delta - \tilde{\theta})/\Delta\) respectively.

We model the firms’ decision as a two-stage game in which simultaneous price-setting follows the simultaneous choice of newscasting and debunking decisions. We commence by discussing permutations of choices that could and could not constitute an equilibrium. Consider a case in which firm \(i\) chooses positive levels of both fake news and debunking activity. Regardless of its rival’s choices, it will have no credibility in its debunking activities; consequently, they simply amount to resources wasted and it must raise its profits by doing no debunking. That is, choosing \(F_1X_1 > 0\) cannot be a best response to any news strategy of a rival and therefore \(F_1X_1 > 0\) cannot feature in any Nash equilibrium to this game, for either firm.

Now suppose that one firm, say \(j\), is issuing no fake news. It cannot be a best response for firm \(i\) to then choose \(F_i = 0\) but \(X_i > 0\) as its debunking activity achieves nothing (and nor could it, as the rival issues no fake news) and so is a waste of resources, regardless of the debunking activity of its rival. Finally, suppose the rival issues fake news \((F_j > 0)\) but undertakes no debunking (so \(X_j = 0\)). Then it cannot be a best response for firm \(i\) to choose \(F_i = X_i = 0\), \textit{i.e.} to issue no fake news and do no debunking. The reason is simply that a little debunking in this case comes at a marginal cost of approximately zero but would have a positive impact on firm \(i\)’s profits by reducing consumers’ willingness to pay for the rival’s product.

This leaves only three remaining possible constellations of behavior: (1) both firms issue no fake news and undertake no debunking activity; (2) both firms issue fake news but undertake no debunking activity; (3) or one firm issues fake news with no debunking and the other does the reverse – has no fake news but debunks its rivals.

1. The first of these cases can only occur if the background level of skepticism amongst consumers is sufficiently high: if \(X\) were to be only infinitesimally different from zero then, given a rival undertaking no debunking, a little fake news has to be profitable for a firm as it reduces the costs of news production with no other consequences.
If $X$ is sufficiently high, however, then the loss of willingness to pay by one’s own consumers when one chooses $F_i > 0$ will be enough to discourage this deviation. In sum, we could observe a Nash equilibrium in which neither firm issues fake news or undertakes debunking only if the general level of skepticism in the economy is sufficient to deter fake news. The model then collapses exactly to a standard Hotelling model. We assume henceforth that $X$ is small enough that this uninteresting case is ruled out.

2. The second symmetric possibility is that both firms issue fake news and neither debunks the other. In this case we also get a Hotelling-like outcome except that the background skepticism of consumers means that willingness to pay for the output of both firms is reduced. We neglect this outcome henceforth, too, as it is one in which there is no debunking and of less interest for current purposes.

3. The case we concentrate on henceforth is the only one in which debunking arises in equilibrium: one firm issues fake news and does no debunking while the other offers no fake news at all but does commit resources to debunking its rival.

We summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition:

**Proposition 1.** In any Nash equilibrium to this game with debunking activity in equilibrium, one and only one firm chooses a positive level of fake news and the other chooses a positive expenditure on debunking.

Without loss of generality we consider henceforth the case in which $F \equiv F_1 > 0 = F_2$ and $X \equiv X_2 > 0 = X_1$. That is, firm 1 issues some fake news and firm 2 attempts to debunk it. Consequently $y_2 = 0$ and $y \equiv y_1 > 0$. We consider first the price-setting stage of the game. Figure 2 illustrates the situation here in the familiar Hotelling diagram plotting consumers’ disutility from the two alternatives according to their location.

We assume throughout the analysis that $v$ is sufficiently high that the market is covered here. Consider the second stage of this game. The levels of $F$ and $X$ have been determined and the firms now simultaneously choose prices. We find:

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7 As Figure 2 makes apparent, this requires that $\tilde{v} > \theta$ where these are defined in $(1 - \tilde{v}ky)v - t\tilde{v} - p_1 = 0$, implying $\tilde{v} = (v - p_1)/(t + vky)$, and $v - t(\Delta - \tilde{\theta}) - p_2 = 0$, implying $\tilde{\theta} = \Delta - (v - p_2)/t$. 

---
Lemma 1. Given $F$ and $X$, the equilibrium prices are

$$p_2 = t\Delta + \frac{2}{3}vky\Delta,$$

$$p_1 = t\Delta + \frac{1}{3}vky\Delta.$$

Proof. See Appendix A.1.

Note that prices in this game are strategic complements. Furthermore, $p_2 - p_1 = vky\Delta/3$ and

$$\tilde{\theta} = \frac{\Delta}{3} \left( \frac{3t + vky}{2t + vky} \right), \quad (1)$$

Intuitively, we find that $\tilde{\theta}$ is decreasing in $y$: as distrust for firm 1 grows so its market share shrinks. Appendix A.2 also calculates the second-stage equilibrium total revenues of the firms, $R_1$ and $R_2$, and shows that $R_2 > R_1$ and that both are increasing in $y$ as well. This is driven by the strategic complementarity of prices: increased distrust of firm 1
1 leads firm 2 to raise its prices and this enables firm 1 to do likewise. Rolling back to the first stage of the game, we can now derive the first-order conditions for $F$ and $X$:

**Lemma 2.** An interior solution requires

$$cF^* > \gamma(1 - F^*). \quad (2)$$

and the first-order conditions for an interior solution are given by

$$\Omega \equiv \left[ \frac{(3t + vky)(t + vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right] \frac{\partial y}{\partial F} + \frac{9\gamma}{vk\Delta}(1 - F) - \frac{9c}{vk\Delta} F = 0,$$

$$\Psi \equiv \left( \frac{(3t + 2vky)(5t + 2vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right) \frac{\partial y}{\partial X} - \frac{9\delta}{vk\Delta} X = 0.$$

**Proof.** See Appendix A.2.

Intuitively, the marginal cost of issuing fake news should not be too small compared to those of debunking to imply $F^* < 1$. We are interested in the response of a news provider that produces both fake and real news, and thus we assume an interior solution in what follows.

### 3 Comparative static results

We now explore, among other things, how the level of fake news and debunking changes with the parameters of our model, in particular with costs, dispersion and the sensitivity of consumers to distrust. We have relegated the mathematical details to Appendix A.3, and Table 1 summarizes the comparative static results, where $W$ denotes a measure of equilibrium welfare discussed below and (+) indicates an increase in the endogenous variable in response to a change in the exogenous variable, (-) indicates a decrease and (?) indicates that the sign of the response is indeterminate.

Table 1 also shows the consequences of parameter changes for firm 1’s market share, $\tilde{\theta}/\Delta$. Note, first, that equilibrium fake news and its debunking move together in these exercises. This is because $\Omega_y = \Psi_y > 0$ so $F$ and $X$ are strategic complements in this setting.

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8Appendix A.5 exemplifies a specification of the $y$ function that meets the requirements of an interior solution.
Table 1: Comparative statics

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That the optimal level of debunking increases with the extent of fake news is perhaps not surprising, but it is also the case that fake news issuance by firm 1 is optimally increased as firm 2’s debunking activity goes up. This is driven by the strategic complementarity of prices in the second stage of the game: an increase in fake news induces a price increase from firm 2 to which firm 1’s best response is a price increase too.

To evaluate welfare here, we consider the traditional sum, denoted by \(W\), of consumers’ surplus (\(CS\)) and the firms’ profits \(\pi_1\) and \(\pi_2\), but we also suppose that there might be some aggregate social losses, denoted by \(K(F)\), associated with exposure to fake news, yielding adjusted social welfare:

\[
AW = W - K(F) = CS + \pi_1 + \pi_2 - K(F),
\]

where \(K'(\cdot) > 0\). Absent this \(K(\cdot)\) term it is clear that the exposure of fake news can only be welfare-reducing in this model: not only does it use real resources but, when consumers learn that some of their information is false, their valuations of news fall. But a number of studies, as discussed earlier, have suggested that fake news can be harmful to society through the consequences it can have not only for the fact of participation in civil society (such as voting, as in Cagé, 2017) but for how that participation occurs (see Barrera et al, 2017.) Consequently, we suppose that there is some aggregate social loss associated with the general falsity of news that people consume. This occurs whether or not people are aware of the truth of what they are being told – people act on the information they gather and the presumption here is that the consequences of those actions are more desirable, on aggregate, the more accurate is the underlying information that triggers them.

\[^9\]If an individual gains from true information only when they know that it is true then the analysis would be isomorphic to the case that follows but with \(K(. ) = 0\): knowing the truth is more valuable than
Appendix A.3 demonstrates that, substituting in for second-stage equilibrium values, we can write welfare $W$ as a function of $F$ and $X$ as follows:

$$W = v - \frac{\Delta}{18} \left\{ \frac{9t^2 + (vk^y)^2 + 9tvk^y}{2t + vk^y} \right\} - \frac{1}{2} \gamma (1 - F)^2 - \frac{1}{2} cf^2 - \frac{1}{2} \delta X^2 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma. \quad (3)$$

Table 1 shows a number of straightforward and intuitive results and three that are of more interest. The straightforward results concern changes in cost parameters and we see that an increase in the marginal cost of fake news ($c$) or the marginal cost of debunking ($\delta$) decreases both the extent of fake news and its debunking and shifts the marginal consumer in favor of firm 1. None of this is particularly surprising. Equally straightforward is the result that an increase in the marginal cost of real news ($\gamma$) leads to an increase in both fake news and its debunking and a contraction of firm 1’s market share. The immediate effect of an increased cost of providing real news is that it is harmful to both firms, but relatively less so for firm 1 who produces less real news in the first place. So it will substitute into fake news at the margin, inducing an increased debunking response from firm 2. This all reduces firm 1’s reputation and the marginal consumer shifts in favor of firm 2.

The first of the more interesting results, however, is the finding that an increase in the dispersion of consumers ($\Delta$) raises the prevalence of fake news and debunking activity. We interpret this exercise as representing an increase in the polarization of consumers – they are more widely spread from left to right. Even absent any change in news choices, this increased dispersion would increase the average disutility of consumers in this model, of course, but it would also increase both firms’ prices; this effect on prices is exacerbated by the increased fake news (and debunking) that is also induced by increased polarization. A feature of Hotelling-type models when the market is covered is that, because of the unit demands, price changes alone have no welfare implications, as they simply transfer income between producers and consumers. However, they do provide signals to producers and in this exercise increased polarization induces greater fake news (and debunking), driven by firms with an eye to second-stage price (and profit) increases. Note that the market share of firm 1 decreases with this change – whilst the marginal consumer shifts ‘right’, it shifts

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knowing something is false so revelation, when the presumption otherwise is that everything is true, must be welfare reducing, exactly as we have in the model absent the $K(\cdot)$ term.
less than the underlying increase in $\Delta$.

Some intuition for why increased polarization raises fake news in this model comes from supposing, first, that firms did not change their news choices as $\Delta$ increased. As they move further apart they are effectively less competitive and we know from the expressions for optimal prices that, consequently, both firms would charge more. However, that price increase makes the competition for more consumers more attractive, as stealing one more customer from the rival now is more valuable due to the higher price. Firm 2, then, is inclined to increase its debunking to this end and, as $F$ and $X$ are strategic complements, so firm 1’s best response to this is to increase its fake news. Perhaps surprisingly, an increase in the sensitivity of consumers to fake news – $k$ – also induces more fake news and debunking. Once more, the increase in $F$ and $X$ reduce the reputation of firm 1 and shrink its market, the marginal consumer now being at a lower $\theta$. It is easily shown that the subsequent increase in prices induced by this increase in $k$ is not sufficient to raise firm 1’s profits so firm 1 is, unsurprisingly, worse off with higher $k$.

The third exercise of some interest here is to consider an exogenous increase in $t$. This measures the ‘locational disutility’ of consumers in getting a less-than-ideal media package (in terms of ideology) and the usual interpretation of an increase in this parameter in a Hotelling model is that it gives the firms more market power, in a sense (in terms of Figure 2 the consumers’ disutility graphs become steeper so a given price increase would induce a smaller decrease in demand, ceteris paribus) and so allows them to increase prices. In this model, however, the induced changes in news provision muddy the waters somewhat. In particular, it cannot be shown that prices rise with an increase in $t$ because the induced falls in $F$ and $X$ mean that firm 1’s reputation improves and this puts downward pressure on prices. Nevertheless, it is the case that firm 1’s market share increase with an increase in $t$ and, along with it, so does firm 1’s profits. One way to think of this is as follows. Consider Lemma 2. The first-order condition for firm 1’s optimal choice of $F$ makes it clear that it will choose a higher level of fake news, in the presence of possible debunking, than it would in a model absent such a feature. Consequently, the

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10 Firm 2’s revenues rise but so too do its costs (as $X$ is increased) and the net result is indeterminate.
11 This is easily seen by looking at the effect of an increase in $t$ in the equations for equilibrium stage-two prices and considering the standard Hotelling case where $k = 0$.
12 If there were no reputational effects of fake news then the first-order condition for firm 1 would feature only the second two of the three terms currently in there – just the cost terms – and the optimal level of $F$ would equate the marginal costs of real and fake news: $\gamma(1 - F) - cF = 0$. But in the presence
increased market power granted by an increase in $t$ essentially enables firm 1 to reduce its over-provision of fake news. This induces a strategic response from firm 2 to decrease its debunking activities.

In terms of welfare, Table 1 shows consequences for “unadjusted” welfare – it unambiguously falls with increases in $\Delta$, $\gamma$ or $k$, although this latter effect must be interpreted with some caution, given that $k$ is essentially a parameter of the welfare function. But, intuitively, consumers that favor firm 1’s product are uniformly harmed by increased sensitivity to its fake news, even aside from the fact that such fake news is increased in firm 1’s equilibrium response. In terms of our adjusted welfare, however, it is clear that it, too, must be decreasing in these three parameters, as Table 1 shows that $F$ is increasing in each of them, so the combined effect of decreased $W$ and increased $F$ must mean that $AW$ falls.

4 Monopoly and the role of a public provider

Our analysis so far was confined to two private firms. We now consider two alternatives. First, we consider a monopolist that replaces the two firms, and we ask what monopolization does to welfare. Second, we introduce a third firm that has a different objective, i.e. a public provider. This public provider does not replace the two firms but is supposed to compete against them. At the same time this public provider is committed to be non-partisan and to issue real news only, and we investigate whether the introduction of public provider can improve welfare.

4.1 Comparison with monopoly

In this subsection, we conduct an exercise motivated by the question raised in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) of whether competition reduces media bias. In their model competition does not reduce media slant when consumers have a bias (i.e. a preference for slant). We consider two comparators in this exercise. The first is an unconstrained monopolist, free to choose ‘location’ and its $F/N$ mix; the second is a no-fake-news provider located at one end of the spectrum (the right-hand end) only. The first of these exercises of debunking we have an added first term which is positive implying that the firm chooses a level of $F$ higher than that which equalizes the marginal cost of the two forms of news.
represents the pure theoretical comparison between our duopoly results and a monopoly; the latter is intended to compare the situation in which we find ourselves currently with an “old media” outcome wherein, be it for reasons of reputation or whatever, fake news was not an option.

If there were a single firm in our model then there can be no debunking beyond the background level $X$. Suppose, for expositional purposes, that it is zero. Consumers cannot then detect fake news at all so it is then optimal for the firm to combine real and fake news, for cost minimization, to the point where their marginal costs are equated, i.e. at $F^{**}$ such that

$$\gamma(1 - F^{**}) - cF^{**} = 0$$

or $F^{**} = \gamma/(c + \gamma)$. In terms of location on the spectrum of consumers, it would optimally choose an interior point and a price such that the marginal consumer on each side obtained zero surplus. Depending on parameters this may or may not involve market coverage but, to make the comparison with our model more clear, we assume that the market is covered. Thus, the firm locates in the center of the spectrum at $\theta = \Delta/2$ and its price will be increased to the point where

$$U_0 = U_\Delta = v - \frac{1}{2}t\Delta - p = 0.$$

Comparing (4) with (2), we see that the equilibrium level of fake news by firm 1 in the duopoly is greater than $F^{**}$ as defined here. It is also the case that, in the duopoly equilibrium, firm 1’s market share is less than firm 2’s (as the latter’s debunking reduces firm 1’s reputation) so, in terms of total fake news being consumed, the monopolist here has a lower ratio of fake to real news than does the fake news firm in the duopoly but it reaches more consumers. In that sense, competition does reduce (to zero) fake news for some of the population but, for those who are still exposed to it, it exacerbates their exposure. Of course, it is also partially exposed through debunking so the welfare implications of this are not immediately obvious. Nevertheless, comparing the two cases we find that, in the duopoly, aggregate “transport” costs are higher, due to the distortion of the marginal consumer away from the center, and total willingness to pay is lower, due to the exposure of fake news issued by firm 1. Furthermore, aggregate news production

---

13None of the comparisons that follow are affected by this assumption, if $X$ is constant across the two cases, but the intuition is easier to see when $X = 0$. 

16
costs are higher, due to (i) the bias towards fake news production by firm 1 away from the equalized marginal cost solution of the monopolist and (ii) the opposite bias towards real news production by firm 2. Thus unadjusted welfare is reduced in going from monopoly to duopoly in this case and, as fake news also increases, so our measure of adjusted welfare must also fall in going from monopoly to a duopoly.\[14\]

As a second comparison, we consider briefly here the effect of the introduction of the possibility of fake news into a world where it previously did not pay to issue it. So suppose the status quo involves simply firm 2 located at point $\Delta$ on the spectrum and issuing only real news.\[15\] Again, whether or not the market is then covered will depend on parameters: (i) If the market is covered then the introduction of firm 1 in the presence of fake news must, by construction, raise the amount of fake news being disseminated. Of course, it also lowers average ‘transport costs’ and willingness to pay so its overall welfare consequences are indeterminate and will depend on the magnitude of the effect of debunking (\textit{i.e.} on $k$.) (ii) And if the monopolist does not initially cover the market then the pro-competitive effects of a fake-news entrant are correspondingly stronger.

4.2 A public provider of news

A useful policy exercise we can consider in this model is how the introduction of a public provider might affect the dissemination of fake news. Many countries have public providers of news and this model is very suitable for the analysis of such a provider when the provider is subject to certain constraints. In particular, we suppose that the public broadcaster (PB) issues only real news and must be non-partisan and free. In the model this means that the PB must locate in the center of the ideological spectrum (\textit{i.e.} at $\Delta/2$) and it must charge a zero price ($p_{PB} = 0$): in the context where these prices are interpreted as the disutility of exposure to advertising, this means the PB is commercial-free.

Note first that, with a free, no-fake-news provider located between them, the two commercial firms in our analysis have no marginal consumer over which they both compete. Consequently, neither will engage in costly debunking, as it yields no benefit to them. In

\[14\] The comparison for $W$ is demonstrated formally in Appendix A.6.

\[15\] Note that comparing our equilibrium to one in which there are two firms, one at each end of the spectrum, neither issuing fake news (or debunking) gives the clear result that allowing fake news, even though it is debunked, lowers welfare: Appendix A.6 demonstrates that welfare here is decreasing in $F$ and $X$ jointly.
the presence of background debunking, however, we need to determine whether the firms wish to choose to issue any fake news or not and this involves a discrete comparison of profits in the two cases.

Appendix A.7 provides the details of this analysis which we summarize here. We can show that each commercial firm chooses approximately the cost-minimizing mix of real and fake news and profitability is higher than if they were simply truthful. So, in the presence of a non-partisan free PB, both commercial firms issue a mix of real and fake news and both charge less than in the laissez faire duopoly. Each of the two firms has a lower market share than absent the PB and, furthermore, their combined market share is less than that of firm 1 alone in the duopoly. Given that the PB issues no fake news, more consumers are now exposed to only real news than in the duopoly. Furthermore, it is only consumers at the extremes of the distribution who are exposed to fake news – albeit at both extremes now, compared to only one in the duopoly.

In terms of welfare, overall willingness to pay increases with the decreased provision of fake news, overall “transport costs” fall with three equally-spaced providers rather than two at extreme locations, and commercial news provision costs fall as both commercial firms move towards the cost-minimizing combination of real and fake news, away from their inefficient mixes in the duopoly. These are all welfare improving changes and, with total fake news falling, these effects mean a PB raises adjusted welfare. However, the costs of providing only real news are expanded by the existence of the PB and, along with any fixed costs of its establishment, this will reduce welfare.

5 Concluding remarks

In this paper we have provided a first analysis of a simple media market in which media providers can not only issue deceptive or fake news but can, at a cost, expose the fake news of their rivals. Our model incorporates a number of significant features of media consumers’ behavior as noted in the literature, particularly with respect to bias and susceptibility to correction of fake news. We have shown that any equilibrium here will involve only one of the firms issuing fake news and we have analyzed that equilibrium and derived some comparative statics to try and understand when fake news (and debunking) is more or less prevalent. We also compare the duopoly outcome with a monopoly solution to see the effects of competition on the prevalence of fake news and we analyze the consequences of
introducing a public news provider into the model.

Our results suggest that fake news (and debunking) will be more prevalent, in equilibrium, the wider the dispersion of consumers in terms of ideology (and, with that, the greater the ideological gulf between media providers); the lower are the marginal costs of providing either fake news or debunking; the higher are the costs of providing real news; and, less intuitively, the lower is the disutility consumers derive from consuming from a less-than-ideal media source and the more sensitive are consumers to fake news (in terms of reduced willingness to pay for a news source exposed to feature fake news.) We show that if equilibrium fake news and debunking are increased by some parameter change then social welfare will also fall. To the extent that the polarization of extreme political perspectives is increasing in Western democracies, as suggested for the U.S. by Lelkes (2016), our model suggests that fake news will continue to rise, despite an increase in debunking activity.

References


Appendix

A.1 Second stage

Consider the second stage. Firms have by then implemented $F$ and $X$, and the resulting $y$ is known to all. The firms now must choose $p_1$ and $p_2$. Firm 1 chooses $p_1$ to maximize

$$\pi_1 = q_1 p_1 = \frac{1}{\Delta} \hat{\theta}(p_1, p_2; y) p_1$$
The first-order condition is given by
\[ \tilde{\theta}(p_1, p_2; y) + p \frac{\partial \tilde{\theta}(p_1, p_2; y)}{\partial p_1} = 0 \]
and yields firm 1’s best response function
\[ p_1 = \frac{t\Delta + p_2}{2} \equiv R_1(p_2). \]

Firm 2 chooses \( p_2 \) to maximize
\[ \pi_2 = q_2 p_2 = \frac{1}{\Delta} \left[ \Delta - \tilde{\theta}(p_1, p_2; y) \right] p_2. \]
The first-order condition is given by
\[ \left[ \Delta - \tilde{\theta}(p_1, p_2; y) \right] - p_2 \frac{\partial \tilde{\theta}(p_1, p_2; y)}{\partial p_2} = 0 \]
and yields firm 2’s best response function
\[ p_2 = \frac{t\Delta + vky\Delta + p_1}{2} \equiv R_2(p_1). \]

Solving for the Nash equilibrium prices, we get
\[ p_2 = t\Delta + \frac{2}{3} vky\Delta \]
\[ p_1 = t\Delta + \frac{1}{3} vky\Delta \]
which proves Lemma [1]. We also get
\[ p_2 - p_1 = \frac{1}{3} vky\Delta, \tilde{\theta} = \frac{\Delta}{3} \left( \frac{3t + vky}{2t + vky} \right) \]
(A.1)
\( \tilde{\theta} \) is decreasing in \( y \), an intuitive result:
\[ \frac{\partial \tilde{\theta}}{\partial y} = -\frac{tvk\Delta}{3 (2t + vky)^2} < 0. \]

The stage 2’s equilibrium revenue of firm 2 is given by
\[ R_2^* = q_2^* p_2^* = \frac{1}{\Delta} \left( \Delta - \tilde{\theta} \right) p_2^* = \frac{\Delta}{9} \left( \frac{(3t + 2vky)^2}{2t + vky} \right), \]
(A.2)
and its derivative w.r.t. $y$ is positive:

$$
\frac{\partial}{\partial y} \frac{(3t + 2vky)^2}{2t + vky} = \frac{vk (3t + 2vky) (5t + 2vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} > 0.
$$

The stage 2’s equilibrium revenue of firm 1 is given by

$$
R_1^* = \bar{q}_1^* p_1^* = \frac{1}{\Delta} \bar{p}_1^* = \frac{\Delta (3t + vky)^2}{9 (2t + vky)}, \tag{A.3}
$$

and its derivative w.r.t. $y$ is positive and has the sign of $t + vky$:

$$
\frac{\partial}{\partial y} \frac{(3t + vky)^2}{2t + vky} = \frac{v (3t + vky) (t + vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} > 0.
$$

Note that this result is driven by the fact that prices are strategic complements. An increase in $y$ makes firm 2 raise its price. This in turn allows firm 1 to increase its price, too.

### A.2 First stage

In the first stage game firm 1 takes $X$ as given and chooses $F \in [0, 1]$ to maximize

$$
\frac{1}{\Delta} \bar{p}_1^* - \frac{\gamma}{2} (1 - F)^2 - \frac{c}{2} F^2
$$

Let $\lambda \geq 0$ be the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with $1 - F \geq 0$. The first-order condition for firm 1 is

$$
\frac{\Delta}{9} \left( \frac{vk (3t + vky) (t + vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right) \frac{\partial y}{\partial F} + \gamma (1 - F) - cF - \lambda = 0. \tag{A.4}
$$

Since $y = G(F, D) \geq 0$, we conclude that if $c = 0$ then firm 1 will set $F^* = 1$. However, if $c > 0$, then it is possible that $F^* < 1$. If $\partial y / \partial F = 0$ at $F = 1$, this is sufficient to ensure an interior solution here: $\partial \pi_1 / \partial F$ evaluated at $F = 1$ is then strictly negative.

Note that, if there were no issues concerning firm 1’s reputation (e.g. $k = 0$) then its first-order condition, at an interior solution and if background skepticism $X$ were zero, would choose $F$ simply to equate the marginal costs of $F$ and $N = 1 - F$. That is, it would choose $F^*$ so that $\gamma (1 - F^*) = cF^*$. With reputational concerns and because the first term in this first-order condition is positive (shown below) so we know that the firm here chooses a higher level of fake news than that which simply equates the marginal costs of the two types of news.

In what follows we assume an interior solution for $F$, that is, $\lambda = 0$, yielding the following first-order condition, implicitly firm 1’s best best response function, $F(X)$:
\[
\frac{\Delta}{9} \left( \frac{vk(3t + vky)(t + vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right) \frac{\partial y}{\partial F} + \gamma(1 - F) - cF = 0 \tag{A.5}
\]

Similarly, firm 2 takes \( F \) as given and chooses \( X \) to maximize

\[
q_2p_2^* - C_N(1) - C_X(X) = \frac{1}{\Delta} (\Delta - \tilde{\theta})p_2^* - \frac{\gamma}{2} - \frac{\delta}{2}X^2
\]

This yields the following first-order condition, implicitly defining firm 2’s best response function, \( X(F) \):

\[
\frac{\Delta}{9} \left( \frac{vk(3t + 2vky)(5t + 2vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right) \frac{\partial y}{\partial X} - \delta X = 0 \tag{A.6}
\]

In case of an interior solution for firm 1, \( \lambda = 0 \), and \( 0 < F^* < 1 \) and simplify the first-order conditions to get:

\[
\Omega \equiv \left[ \frac{(3t + vky)(t + vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right] \frac{\partial y}{\partial F} + \frac{9\gamma}{vk\Delta} (1 - F) - \frac{9c}{vk\Delta} F = 0
\]

\[
\Psi \equiv \left[ \frac{(3t + 2vky)(5t + 2vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right] \frac{\partial y}{\partial X} - \frac{9\delta}{vk\Delta} X = 0
\]

By the second-order conditions for the firms’ choices we have \( \Omega_F < 0 \) and \( \Psi_X < 0 \). Furthermore, we assume stability such that \( J \equiv \Omega_F \Psi_X - \Omega_X \Psi_F > 0 \). In an interior solution for firm 1, as the first term in \( \Omega \) is positive, so it must be the case that

\[
cF^* > \gamma(1 - F^*). \tag{A.7}
\]

### A.3 Comparative statics

Differentiation of \( \Omega \) yields

\[
\Omega_y = \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \left[ \frac{(3t + vky)(t + vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right] = \frac{2vkt^2}{(2t + vky)^3} > 0.
\]

so firm 1’s second-order condition is given by

\[
\Omega_F = \Omega_y \left( \frac{\partial y}{\partial F} \right)^2 + \left( \frac{(3t + vky)(t + vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right) \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial F^2} - \frac{9(\gamma + c)}{vk\Delta} < 0.
\]

For firm 2,

\[
\Psi_y = \frac{\partial}{\partial y} \left[ \frac{(3t + 2vky)(5t + 2vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right] = \frac{2vkt^2}{(2t + vky)^3} > 0,
\]

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and we observe that
\[ \Omega_y = \Psi_y \] (A.8)
such that the second-order condition is given by
\[ \Psi_X \equiv \Psi_y \left( \frac{\partial y}{\partial X} \right)^2 + \left( \frac{(3t + 2vky) (5t + 2vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right) \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial X^2} - \frac{9\delta}{vk\Delta} < 0. \]

In what follows, we assume that
\[ \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial F \partial X} > 0. \]
Consider comparative static exercises in this system with respect to some parameter \( s \).
From the first-order conditions,
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\Omega_F & \Omega_X \\
\Psi_F & \Psi_X
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
dF/ds \\
dX/ds
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
-\Omega_s \\
-\Psi_s
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

Note that
\[ \Omega_X = \Omega_y \left( \frac{\partial y}{\partial X} \right) \left( \frac{\partial y}{\partial F} \right) + \left( \frac{(3t + vky) (t + vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right) \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial F \partial X} > 0, \]
\[ \Psi_F = \Psi_y \left( \frac{\partial y}{\partial X} \right) \left( \frac{\partial y}{\partial F} \right) + \left( \frac{(3t + 2vky) (5t + 2vky)}{(2t + vky)^2} \right) \frac{\partial^2 y}{\partial F \partial X} > 0. \]

Given \( J > 0 \), we get the following comparative static expressions:
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
dF/ds \\
dX/ds
\end{bmatrix}
= \frac{1}{J} \begin{bmatrix}
-\Omega_s & \Omega_X \\
-\Psi_s & \Psi_X
\end{bmatrix}
= \frac{1}{J} \begin{bmatrix}
\{-\Omega_s \Psi_X + \Psi_s \Omega_X \} \\
\{-\Omega_F \Psi_s + \Psi_F \Omega_s \}
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

First consider the effects of an increase in dispersion (an increase in \( \Delta \)). Let \( \phi \equiv 1/(vk\Delta) \) which is decreasing in \( \Delta \). Then,
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\Omega_F & \Omega_X \\
\Psi_F & \Psi_X
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
dF/d\phi \\
dX/d\phi
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
-\Omega_\phi \\
-\Psi_\phi
\end{bmatrix},
\]
where
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
-\Omega_\phi \\
-\Psi_\phi
\end{bmatrix}
= 9 \begin{bmatrix}
\epsilon F^* - \gamma (1 - F^*) \\
\delta X^*
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
(+) \\
(+)
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

We get the following comparative static result:
\[
\frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \Delta} = \frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \phi} \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \Delta} = \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \Delta} \frac{1}{J} (-\Omega_\phi \Psi_X + \Psi_\phi \Omega_X) > 0.
\]
Thus an increase $\Delta$ will lead to an increase in fake news. An increase in $\Delta$ is to be interpreted as an increase in polarization: the distance between the extreme right and the extreme left is getting bigger. Similarly:

$$\frac{\partial X^*}{\partial \Delta} = \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial \phi} \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \Delta} = \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \Delta} \frac{1}{J} \left(-\Omega_F \Psi_\phi + \Psi_F \Omega_\phi\right) > 0.$$  

So an increase in polarization also raises the amount of debunking. Second, consider the effects of an increase in $t$:

$$\left[\begin{array}{c} -\Omega_t \\ -\Psi_t \end{array}\right] = \frac{2tvky}{(2t + vky)^3} \left[\begin{array}{c} \frac{\partial y}{\partial F} \\ \frac{\partial y}{\partial X} \end{array}\right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} (+) \\ (+) \end{array}\right].$$

We get the following comparative static results:

$$\frac{\partial F^*}{\partial t} = \frac{1}{J} \left(-\Omega_t \Psi_X + \Psi_t \Omega_X\right) < 0, \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial t} = \frac{1}{J} \left(-\Omega_F \Psi_t + \Psi_F \Omega_t\right) < 0.$$  

Thus an increase in $t$ will decrease both the quantity of fake news and the extent of debunking. Third, consider the effects of an increase in $k$:

$$\left[\begin{array}{c} -\Omega_k \\ -\Psi_k \end{array}\right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} -\frac{2t^2vy}{(2t + vky)^3} \left(\frac{\partial y}{\partial F}\right) - \frac{9(cF - \gamma(1 - F))}{vky\Delta} \\ -\frac{2vky^2}{(2t + vky)^3} \left(\frac{\partial y}{\partial X}\right) - \frac{9\delta X}{vky\Delta} \end{array}\right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} (-) \\ (-) \end{array}\right].$$

We get the following comparative static results:

$$\frac{\partial F^*}{\partial k} = \frac{1}{J} \left(-\Omega_k \Psi_X + \Psi_k \Omega_X\right) > 0, \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial k} = \frac{1}{J} \left(-\Omega_F \Psi_k + \Psi_F \Omega_k\right) > 0.$$  

Thus an increase in $k$ will increase both the quantity of fake news and the extent of debunking. Fourth, consider the effects of an increase in $\delta$:

$$\left[\begin{array}{c} -\Omega_\delta \\ -\Psi_\delta \end{array}\right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} 0 \\ \frac{9F}{v\delta\Delta} \end{array}\right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} 0 \\ (+) \end{array}\right].$$

We get the following comparative static results:

$$\frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \delta} = \frac{1}{J} \left(\Psi_\delta \Omega_X\right) < 0, \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial \delta} = \frac{1}{J} \left(-\Omega_F \Psi_\delta\right) < 0.$$  

Thus an increase in $\delta$ will decrease both the quantity of fake news and the extent of debunking. Fifth, consider the effects of an increase in $c$:

$$\left[\begin{array}{c} -\Omega_c \\ -\Psi_c \end{array}\right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} \frac{9F}{v\delta\Delta} \\ 0 \end{array}\right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} (+) \\ 0 \end{array}\right].$$

We get the following comparative static results:

$$\frac{\partial F^*}{\partial c} = \frac{1}{J} \left(-\Psi_X \Omega_c\right) < 0, \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial c} = \frac{1}{J} \left(\Omega_c \Psi_F\right) < 0.$$  

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Thus an increase in $c$ will decrease both the quantity of fake news and the extent of debunking. Sixth, consider the effects of an increase in $\gamma$:

$$\begin{bmatrix}
-O\gamma \\
-\Psi \delta
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
-\frac{9(1-F^*)}{vk\Delta} \\
0
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
(-) \\
0
\end{bmatrix}.$$

We get the following comparative static results:

$$\frac{\partial F^*}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{1}{J} (-\Psi X \Omega \gamma) > 0, \frac{\partial X^*}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{1}{J} (\Omega \gamma \Psi F) > 0.$$ 

Thus an increase in $\gamma$ will increase both the quantity of fake news and the extent of debunking. Finally, consider firm 1’s market share:

$$\frac{\hat{\theta}}{\Delta} = \frac{1}{3} \left( \frac{3t + vky}{2t + vky} \right) \equiv \tilde{\theta}.$$ 

We have

$$\frac{d\hat{\theta}}{d\Delta} = \frac{\hat{\theta}_y y_\Delta}{(-)} < 0; \frac{d\hat{\theta}}{dt} = \frac{\hat{\theta}}{(+)} + \hat{\theta}_y y_t > 0;$$

$$\frac{d\hat{\theta}}{dk} = \frac{\hat{\theta}}{(-)} + \hat{\theta}_y y_k < 0; \frac{d\hat{\theta}}{d\delta} = \hat{\theta}_y y_\delta < 0; \frac{d\hat{\theta}}{dc} = \hat{\theta}_y y_c > 0; \frac{d\hat{\theta}}{d\gamma} = \hat{\theta}_y y_\gamma > 0.$$ 

### A.4 Welfare

Defining welfare as the sum of consumer surplus ($CS$) and profits ($\pi_1$ and $\pi_2$), we have

$$CS = \int_0^{\hat{\theta}} [(1 - \theta ky) v - p_1] f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\Delta} [v - p_2] f(\theta) d\theta - T.$$ 

where $T$ denotes the total disutility (“transport”) costs from location:

$$T = \int_0^{\hat{\theta}} \theta t f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\Delta} [\Delta - \theta] t f(\theta) d\theta = \frac{1}{\Delta} \left[ \frac{1}{2} t \theta^2 \right]_0^{\hat{\theta}} + \frac{1}{\Delta} \left[ \Delta \theta - \frac{1}{2} t \theta^2 \right]_{\hat{\theta}}^{\Delta} = t \left( \frac{1}{\Delta} \hat{\theta}^2 - \hat{\theta} + \frac{1}{2} \Delta \right).$$

Consumer surplus is given by

$$CS = \frac{1}{\Delta} \left[ (v - p_1) \theta - \frac{1}{2} vky \theta^2 \right]_0^{\hat{\theta}} + \frac{1}{\Delta} \left[ (v - p_2) \theta \right]_{\hat{\theta}}^{\Delta} - T$$

$$= \frac{1}{\Delta} \left( (v - p_1) \hat{\theta} - \frac{1}{2} vky \hat{\theta}^2 + (v - p_2) \Delta - (v - p_2) \hat{\theta} \right) - T$$

$$= v \left( 1 - \frac{k\hat{\theta}}{2\Delta} \right) - R_1 - R_2 - T,$$
where \( R_i \) denotes the total revenue of firm \( i = 1, 2 \). Using \( \pi_1 = R_1 - \gamma (1 - F)^2 / 2 - cF^2 / 2 \) and \( \pi_2 = R_2 - \gamma / 2 - \delta X^2 / 2 \) we find:

\[
W = v \left( 1 - \frac{ky}{2\Delta} \tilde{\theta}^2 \right) - t \left( \frac{1}{\Delta} \tilde{\theta}^2 - \tilde{\theta} + \frac{1}{2} \Delta \right) - \frac{1}{2} \gamma (1 - F)^2 - \frac{1}{2} cF^2 - \frac{1}{2} \delta X^2 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma.
\]

From (A.1) we have

\[
\tilde{\theta} = \Delta \left[ \frac{3t + vky}{2t + vky} \right],
\]

and substituting into our expression for welfare and simplifying yields

\[
W = v - \Delta \left( \frac{9t^2 + (vky)^2 + 9tvky}{2t + vky} \right) - t\Delta \left( \frac{1}{9} [.]^2 - \frac{1}{3} [.] + \frac{1}{2} \right) - Z,
\]

where \( Z = \gamma (1 - F)^2 / 2 + cF^2 / 2 + \delta X^2 / 2 + \gamma / 2 \). Rearranging terms and simplifying further yields

\[
W = v - \Delta \left( \frac{9t^2 + (vky)^2 + 9tvky}{2t + vky} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \gamma (1 - F)^2 - \frac{1}{2} cF^2 - \frac{1}{2} \delta X^2 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma. \tag{A.9}
\]

We can then derive:

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial y} \left( \frac{9t^2 + (vky)^2 + 9tvky}{2t + vky} \right) = \frac{vk (9t^2 + (vky)^2 + 4tvky)}{(2t + vky)^2} > 0.
\]

To consider the effect on welfare of a change in some parameter \( s \), we find that

\[
\frac{dW}{ds} = \frac{\partial W}{\partial s} - \Delta \left\{ \frac{\partial \{\cdot\}}{\partial y} \left( \frac{dy}{dF} \frac{dF}{ds} + \frac{dy}{dX} \frac{dX}{ds} \right) \right\} - \frac{(cF - \gamma (1 - F))}{ds} \frac{dF}{ds} - \delta X \frac{dX}{ds},
\]

where the partial derivative of \( W \) with respect to \( s \) holds \( y \) fixed.

Now consider the welfare effects of increased polarization \( i.e. \) where \( s = \Delta \). Holding \( y \) fixed, we have \( \partial W / \partial \Delta = -\{\cdot\} / 18 < 0 \) and our earlier comparative statics showed that both \( F \) and \( X \) are increasing in \( \Delta \). Overall, then, \( dW / d\Delta < 0 \). Consider, instead, an increase in \( k \). From (A.9) the partial effect on \( W \) of an increase in \( k \) is exactly the same as that of an increase in \( y \) and that effect is negative. Both \( F \) and \( X \) are increasing in \( k \) so we can also conclude that \( dW / dk < 0 \). Suppose the marginal cost of real news, \( \gamma \), increases. This increases both \( F \) and \( X \), as shown earlier, and \( \partial W / \partial \gamma = -(1 - F)^2 / 2 - 1 / 2 < 0 \) so it is also the case that \( dW / d\gamma < 0 \).

Other parameter changes have less determinate effects on welfare. Looking at (A.9), the impact of a change in \( v \) is the same as that of a change in \( k \) except for its direct effect.
That is, $dW/dv = 1 + dW/dk$, the sign of which is not immediately determinate. For a change in $t$ we can derive the following:

$$\frac{\partial W}{\partial t} = -\frac{\Delta}{18} \frac{\partial \{\cdot\}}{\partial t} = -\frac{\Delta}{18} \frac{18t^2 + 7(vky)^2 + 18vky}{(2t + vky)^2} < 0$$

Given that both $F$ and $X$ are decreasing in $t$, however, this leaves the sign of $dW/dt$ indeterminate. Similarly for increases in $c$ or $\delta$: each has a negative direct partial effect on $W$ but reduces both $F$ and $X$, leaving the overall welfare consequences indeterminate.

### A.5 The boundedness of $y$

For an example of a $y$ function that satisfies the respective conditions, we assume that only firm 1 produces fake news, denoted by $F$, and that firm 2 does not produce fake news. Firm 2’s debunking expenditure is denoted by $X$.

Let $y$ denote the level of public distrust of firm 1’s news. If $y = 0$, there is no distrust; if $y = 1$, the distrust is complete. Write

$$y = G(F, D) \text{ where } 0 \leq F \leq 1 \text{ and } D \geq 0$$

We assume that $y$ is bounded above by 1, for all possible $F \in [0, 1]$, and all $D \geq 0$. For example, consider the CES function

$$y = [F^{-1} + D^{-1}]^{-1} = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{F} + \frac{1}{D}}$$

Note that $y$ is increasing in $D$ and in $F$. Since $0 \leq F \leq 1$, we have $1 \leq 1/F \leq \infty$, therefore

$$1 \geq F = \frac{1}{F} = \frac{1}{F} + \frac{1}{\infty} > \frac{1}{F} + \frac{1}{D} \geq \frac{1}{F} + \frac{1}{0} = 0$$

Thus $1 \geq y \geq 0$ for all possible $F \in [0, 1]$, and all $D \geq 0$.

The above argument generalises easily to all CES functions with elasticity of substitution $\varepsilon_s$ less than 1:

$$y = [F^{-\eta} + D^{-\eta}]^{-1/\eta} \text{ where } \eta > 0 \text{ so } \varepsilon_s = \frac{1}{1+\eta} < 1$$

Then

$$y = \left[ \frac{1}{F^{-\eta} + D^{-\eta}} \right]^{1/\eta} = \left[ \frac{1}{F^{\eta} + D^{\eta}} \right]^{1/\eta}$$

and by the same argument as above, we can see that $0 \leq y \leq 1$ for all possible $F \in [0, 1]$, and all $D \geq 0$. This generalizes further so that

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial F} = 0 \text{ at } F = 1, \text{ and } \frac{\partial y}{\partial F} > 0 \text{ at } F < 1 \quad (A.10)$$
Consider the monotone increasing transformation $Z = Z(F)$ for $0 \leq F \leq 1$, where $Z'(F) > 0$ for $F < 1$ and $Z'(F) = 0$ for $F = 1$; an example is $Z = F(2 - F)$. Next, suppose that

$$y = \left[ \frac{1}{Z(F)^\eta} + \frac{1}{F^\eta} \right]^{1/\eta}, \quad \eta > 0$$

Then we can verify that condition (A.10) is satisfied. This addresses the paper’s sufficient condition for firm 1’s optimal choice $F^*$ to be in the interior of the interval $[0, 1]$.

### A.6 Comparison with a monopoly provider

Suppose there were a single monopoly provider of news in this market. By construction, any fake news it issues cannot be debunked so, if we take the case absent background skepticism (where $X = 0$), consumers cannot distinguish the nature of its news offering. If the market is covered then this firm will locate in the center of the consumer distribution, at $\Delta/2$, and will set a price $p$ that extracts all surplus from the extreme marginal consumers at $\theta = 0$ and $\theta = \Delta$. That is, $v - p - t(\Delta/2) = 0$ or

$$p = \frac{1}{2} (2v - t\Delta)$$

As it sells to all consumers so its total sales are 1 and its revenue is just $R = p$. Formally, its profit maximisation problem is as follows:

$$\max_{p,F} \pi = p - \frac{1}{2} c F^2 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma (1 - F)^2.$$ 

In choosing its optimal mix of fake and real news it just seeks to minimize the cost of news production, which leads to the equating of the marginal costs of each type of news:

$$cF - \gamma (1 - F) = 0 \implies F^* = \frac{\gamma}{c + \gamma}, (1 - F^*) = \frac{c}{c + \gamma}$$

Consequently, the total cost of news provision is equal to

$$\frac{1}{2} c (F^*)^2 + \frac{1}{2} \gamma (1 - F^*)^2 = \frac{1}{2} \frac{c\gamma}{c + \gamma}.$$ 

Evaluating welfare in this case we find:

$$W = \int_0^\Delta [v - p] f(\theta) d\theta - t \int_0^{\Delta/2} \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} - \theta \right) f(\theta) d\theta - t \int_{\Delta/2}^\Delta \left( \theta - \frac{\Delta}{2} \right) f(\theta) d\theta + p - \frac{1}{2} \frac{c\gamma}{c + \gamma}$$

$$= v - \frac{1}{4} t\Delta - \frac{1}{2} \frac{c\gamma}{c + \gamma}.$$ 

---

\[^{16}\text{The case where there is background skepticism is qualitatively the same, so long as that skepticism is sufficiently small.}\]
Comparing this last expression to \((A.9)\), i.e. welfare in the duopoly case of the paper, a sufficient condition for welfare under the monopoly to be higher is:
\[
\frac{\Delta}{18} \left\{ 9t^2 + (vky)^2 + 9tvky \right\} > \frac{1}{4} t\Delta \implies 2 \left\{ \frac{t^2 + \frac{1}{9} (vky)^2 + tvky}{2t + vky} \right\} > t \implies
\]
\[
2t^2 + \frac{2}{9} (vky)^2 + 2tvky > 2t^2 + tvky \implies \frac{2}{9} (vky)^2 + tvky > 0,
\]
and this last inequality is true.

A.7 Introducing a public provider

As before, we consider a two-stage game of the choice of news mix and then price. Consider first the case in which a firm chooses \(F = 0\). As the two firms are symmetric we consider, without loss of generality, only the problem facing firm 1. It is located to the left of the PB at location 0 and so there exists a marginal consumer for which surplus from each is identical:
\[
v - t \left( \ddot{\theta} \right) - p_1 = v - t \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} - \ddot{\theta} \right),
\]
and this solves for:
\[
\ddot{\theta} = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} - \frac{1}{t} p_1 \right).
\]
Consequently, firm 1 faces demand:
\[
q_1 = \frac{1}{\Delta} \left( \ddot{\theta} \right) = \frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{2\Delta} \left( \frac{p_1}{t} \right).
\]
In the second stage, given the chosen news mix of \(F = 0\), the firm’s problem is given by
\[
\max_{p_1} \pi_1 = p_1 q_1 = \frac{1}{4} p_1 - \frac{1}{2t\Delta} (p_1)^2.
\]
Deriving the first-order condition and solving for the optimal price yields
\[
p_1^* = \frac{1}{4} (t\Delta) \implies \ddot{\theta}^* = \frac{1}{8} (\Delta) \implies q_1^* = \frac{1}{8} \implies \pi_1^* = \frac{t\Delta}{32} - \frac{1}{2} \gamma.
\]
Second, consider the case where \(F > 0\). With \(X > 0\) we have \(y = G(F, X) > 0\) and the marginal consumer is determined by
\[
(1 - ky) v - t \left( \ddot{\theta} \right) - p_1 = v - t \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} - \ddot{\theta} \right),
\]
and this solves for:
\[
\ddot{\theta} = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{2t} p_1 - \frac{kvy}{2t}.
\]
Consequently, firm 1 faces demand:

\[ q_1 = \frac{1}{\Delta} \left( \hat{\theta} \right) = \frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{2\Delta} \left( \frac{p_1}{t} \right) - \frac{kvy}{2t\Delta}. \]

In the second stage, given the chosen news mix of \( F > 0 \), the firm’s problem is:

\[ \max_{p_1} \pi_1 = p_1q_1 = \frac{1}{4}p_1 - \frac{1}{2t\Delta} (p_1)^2 - \frac{kvy}{2t\Delta} p_1. \]

Deriving the first-order condition and solving for the optimal price yields:

\[ p_1^* = \frac{t}{2} \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} - \frac{kvy}{t} \right) \implies \hat{\theta}^* = \frac{1}{8} \left( \Delta - \frac{2kvy}{t} \right) \implies q_1^* = \frac{1}{4\Delta} \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} - \frac{kvy}{t} \right). \]

In the first stage, then, denoting by \( C(F) \) the total cost of the news mix \( \{cF^2/2 + \gamma(1 - F)^2/2\} \), we have:

\[ \max_{p_1} \pi_1 = p_1^*q_1^* - C(F) = \frac{t}{8\Delta} \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} - \frac{kvy}{t} \right)^2 - C(F). \]

The first-order condition w.r.t. \( F \) yields:

\[ \frac{d\pi_1}{dF} = - \frac{kvy}{4\Delta} \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} - \frac{kvy}{t} \right) y_F - C'(F) = 0, \]

where \( y_F > 0 \), \( C'(F) = cF - \gamma (1 - F) = (\gamma + c) F - \gamma \), and this first-order condition implicitly defines the optimal \( F \), which, by assumption, is positive (so \( C''(F) \leq 0 \)). Thus,

\[ \pi_1^* = \frac{t}{8\Delta} \left( \frac{\Delta}{2} - \frac{kvy}{t} \right)^2 - C(F). \]

Consider the case where \( X = 0 \). In this case we have:

\[ F^* = \frac{\gamma}{c + \gamma}, p_1^* = \frac{t\Delta}{4}, q_1^* = \frac{1}{8} \implies \pi_1^* = \frac{t\Delta}{32} - C(F^*) = \frac{t\Delta}{32} - \frac{1}{2} \frac{c\gamma}{\gamma + c}, \]

where the optimal choice of \( F \) simply involves minimising news production costs: \( C''(F) = 0 \). So the profits for the firm are given by

\[ \pi_1^* = \frac{t\Delta}{32} - \frac{1}{2} \frac{c}{\gamma + c} > \frac{t\Delta}{32} - \frac{1}{2} \gamma, \]

where the latter are the profits, calculated above, for the firm choosing no fake news. Consequently, profits are higher for the firm here than in the \( F = 0 \) case. By continuity, if \( X \) is sufficiently small so that \( y \) is sufficiently close to zero, the firm’s best response is still to choose some non-zero \( F \) close to the cost-minimizing solution.
In sum, so long as background skepticism is sufficiently small, the optimal response for firm 1 to the PB is to issue the cost-minimizing amount of fake news, price at $t\Delta/4$ and obtain a market share of $1/8$. Things are symmetric for firm 2 at the other end of the spectrum.

Comparing this outcome in the presence of a PB to the case of the duopoly already analyzed we can see that each commercial firm has a smaller market share here. In the duopoly firm 1 had the smaller share, but here we have

$$\bar{\theta} = \frac{\Delta}{8} < \frac{\Delta}{4} < \frac{\Delta}{3} < \frac{\Delta 3t + vky}{3 2t + vky}$$

where the last expression is firm 1’s market share in the duopoly. Each charges a lower price (here it is $t\Delta/4 < t\Delta < t\Delta + vky\Delta/3$ where the latter is $p_1$ in the duopoly and $p_1 < p_2$) and, while firm 2 issues some fake news in the presence of the PB whereas it does not in the commercial duopoly, firm 1’s fake news proportion goes down. Indeed, the total population exposed to fake news in the presence of a PB falls from firm 1’s market share in the duopoly to $\Delta/4$, the combined commercial market share with a PB. So overall exposure to fake news falls in the PB equilibrium compared to the commercial duopoly.

Finally, aside from the costs involved with the establishment of the PB and its provision of only real news, its introduction must otherwise raise adjusted welfare: total “transport costs” fall with three equally-spaced providers rather than two at the extremes, total costs of commercial news provision fall in the absence of any debunking expenditures, and with the mix of real and fake news getting closer to the cost-minimizing ratio for both firms, the negative social costs of fake news fall as less is provided, and total willingness to pay increases with the decreased provision of fake news.